This article deals with the concept of greed as pertaining to Business Ethics in today’s world, considered part of the system of the study Ethics as such, in the backdrop of the recent happenings in the financial world in the USA, whose repercussions have been felt all over. The analysis draws inspiration from the words in the Mahabharata, both with a view to improving the existing theories in place in the West today, as well as having a handle on greed (...) management so needed to set liberalism on the right footing. The article brings into focus the secular spirituality imbedded in the epic relating to the concept harmony, without recourse to God parlance, a virtue around which the ethical considerations move, bringing a needed improvement on the Virtue Ethics of today, and harmonizing the three conflicting ethical theories of the day. Greed management is effective only when we look beyond science to the area of values putting the right emphasis on Virtue Ethics. (shrink)

"This book on Ethics draws upon the words of wisdom found in the Mahabharata, following the spirit of Bernard Williams' proposal that we look for inspiration for the modern-day ethical understanding in the ideas of the past. In elucidating the literary and religious meaning of the Mahabharata, the author probes for the ethical and epistemological truth it contains, in the frame of reference of the uniquely Indian variety of existentialism. In the process he has not only come to an understanding (...) of the principle of morality, along with the relation holding among Satya (Factual Truth), Rta (Truth as Value) and Dharma (Righteousness in Conduct), but has come up with observations that shed fresh light on the analysis of the epic itself."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Description: The book points to a new logic of singular designators based upon a close analysis of work in the area by contemporary philosophers of language. The philosophers range from Frege, Russell, Quine, Strawson and Dummett to Kripke, Hintikka, Plantinga, Kaplan, Donnellan, Searle and Burge. It is generally taken for granted that proper names are rigid designators, having no meaning content, which explains their intranslatability into other languages. However, they do have their modes of presentation that must constitute their sense. (...) There is little room for contradiction here in admitting that proper names have a sense, which does not amount to meaning. One of the advantages of this position is that it blocks the emergence of the Kripkean puzzle about belief by accepting different belief contents corresponding to a variation in the senses of the names involved. Is Kripke's distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators finally valid' the author asks, questioning the corollaries that are supposed to follow from the distinction, viz., that proper names do not have descriptive backing, and that there are contingent a priori truths. He draws our attention to predicative occurrences of proper names, in the modal context, matching corresponding occurrences of definite descriptions. His explanation of contingency, where proper names or definite descriptions are involved, is innovatively straight, simple and broad-based, at par with situations having ordinary predicates. Parts of the book have taken a final shape in response to comments by Strawson, Dummett and Burge. (shrink)

Perhaps academe has grown too used to reading interpretations of traditional Indian texts (Hindu and other) offered in terms of the so-called historical-critical method, with its misleading promise of an "objective" reading of such texts, divorced from personal prejudice or preconceptions. As we advance ever further in the study of hermeneutics, we realize that this can hardly be the case. The secret lies in unearthing and taming prejudice, in converting it into acceptable bias, rather than in pretending that it isn't (...) there. There is a further lapse in those who apply the so-called objective method, namely their failure, on too many occasions, to appreciate what such texts mean to those who appropriate them as .. (shrink)

Drawing upon the insights of Rabindranath Tagore, who coined the term viswasahitya to express his own understanding of comparative literature, this essay resituates translation as the cornerstone for new directions in world literature. While conventional understandings of world literature tend to reconfirm existing power structures and hierarchies, translation opens up the possibility of thinking beyond the national/global binary by interrogating the lines along which such binaries are conceptualized. Translation operates at the borders that are seen to divide cultures, languages, worldviews (...) and geographies. This essay explores the dynamic relationship between translation and world literature within contemporary South Asian writing, through an analysis of heteroglossia, multilingualism and ‘translatedness’ in selected texts by Mahasweta Devi and Amitav Ghosh, opening up larger questions about multilingualism and also about the very discipline of comparative literature. Highlighting the role that translation has historically played in shaping power relations in the world, this paper projects the transformative potential of translation as the key to a radical reconceptualization of a world literature for the future. (shrink)

Praise for the First Edition: '... a unique and lively business ethics text... fresh and delightful... Sekhar's witty use of stories and cases will engage and enlighten business people in India and the rest of the world' - Joanne B Ciulla, The Journal of Business Ethics 'Richly international in scope and contributes to global concern' - Newsltter IIAS Leiden University 'This book makes an important contribution through its holisitc and balanced approach to the issue... Each chapter has a fair (...) number of relevant cases - many of which are good living examples one can learn from' - Business Standard This Second Edition of Sekhar's highly acclaimed book on business ethics has been revised keeping the student reader in mind. This unique text discusses the way ethical conflicts are handled in reality. The author argues that ethical education should be designed to produce balanced, pleasant and effective managers with the power of insight. Only then will they have the courage to create and use ethically desirable means to sustain organizations in an ambience of liberalism and democratic choice. (shrink)

What is the relationship between anger and justice, especially when so much of our moral education has taught us to value the impartial spectator, the cold distance of reason? In _Sing the Rage_, Sonali Chakravarti wrestles with this question through a careful look at the emotionally charged South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which from 1996 to 1998 saw, day after day, individuals taking the stand to speak—to cry, scream, and wail—about the atrocities of apartheid. Uncomfortable and surprising, these (...) public emotional displays, she argues, proved to be of immense value, vital to the success of transitional justice and future political possibilities. Chakravarti takes up the issue from Adam Smith and Hannah Arendt, who famously understood both the dangers of anger in politics and the costs of its exclusion. Building on their perspectives, she argues that the expression and reception of anger reveal truths otherwise unavailable to us about the emerging political order, the obstacles to full civic participation, and indeed the limits—the frontiers—of political life altogether. Most important, anger and the development of skills needed to truly listen to it foster trust among citizens and recognition of shared dignity and worth. An urgent work of political philosophy in an era of continued revolution, _Sing the Rage_ offers a clear understanding of one of our most volatile—and important—political responses. (shrink)

This essay is part of a special issue celebrating 50 years of Political Theory. The ambition of the editors was to mark this half century not with a retrospective but with a confabulation of futures. Contributors were asked: What will political theory look and sound like in the next century and beyond? What claims might political theorists or their descendants be making in ten, twenty-five, fifty, a hundred years’ time? How might they vindicate those claims in their future contexts? How (...) will the consistent concerns of political theorists evolve into the questions critical for people decades or centuries from now? What new problems will engage the political theorists (or their rough equivalents) of the future? What forms might those take? What follows is one of the many confabulations published in response to these queries. (shrink)

A model is presented that examines the interactions between employee and organizational values toward the natural environment and its influence on important sustainability-related outcomes. Perspectives from the new environmental paradigm , anthropocentric value orientation , behavioral view of HRM , and person-organizational are applied. The overall proposition is that level of congruence between employee and company values toward the natural environment influences employee attitudes toward firm green initiatives, organizational commitment, and turnover intentions.

The first article in this issue attempts to refute the concept of Altruism and calls it akin to Selfishness. The arguments are logically set in the way like that of Spinoza’s method of demonstration, with Axioms, Definitions, Propositions and Notes: so as to make them exact and precise. Interestingly, the writer introduces a new concept of Credit and through various other original propositions and examples rebuts the altruistic nature which is generally ascribed to humans.

What separates living things or more specifically Human beings from other things is the ability to do certain activities with an intention and to be conscious of what they do. This is why these other things are called dead or non living. This distinction between the living and the dead is of great philosophical interest. Humans are sentient, i.e. they are aware of what they do and what happens around them. By around I mean the surroundings and observance of nature (...) which Humans as a spectator do. And this includes all the natural things as well as living things including plants, animals, insects etc. What separates Humans from others, for there do seems a difference between objects such as a rock table etc, organisms which includes animals, plants etc and Human beings on the one hand and my self. The point here is to understand and explore this distinction between the living and the dead. Or if I be more specific, the special feature or quality in Humans that separates them from every other thing in this nature, so what it is to be self and to be alive and how it is different from another thing which may not be alive? How are they different from each other? For if we fail to give an answer or reason for why we think like this, then though despite of noticing this distinction, we will fail to take it as a knowledge claim, and perhaps might just end up taking it to be like a folk psychological view. In the hope of describing such confused matters carefully and clearly, an attempt is bestowed in the form of conversation between two persons in order to deal with the philosophy of simplicity, where the first mind or character Q, due to his curiosity and desire to know is unaware and the other person P, whose basis of knowledge is his simple is a disciple of life as proposed by the other self. Here the oblivious person due to his unknowingness is inquisitive and thus he can only find solutions of his doubts by either asking these queries to himself or to any other being. On the other hand, the other person, who is also desperate knowledge seeker, plays a role of learned for the time being, yet they may change their roles at times and this is agreed by the acceptance of both the persons. A major thing pertains from the nature of both these fictitious characters, and that is the importance of questioning in our lives. Questioning is normally a verbal act which is probably used to collect an amount of data to clear your doubts. Questions are addressed in two ways, firstly to the self and secondly, by to people other than you. Both Q and P follow both the ways, however, generally, it is considered that a person involved into self-questioning is deeper by nature. But this is only true and such a situation arises only, when one really accepts or knows that he is aware of something. Greek philosopher Socrates (469-399 B.C.) always questioned others in order to reach understanding. This was because he firmly felt that he knows nothing so how can he obtain his answers by questioning himself. However, in my opinion for the refinement and to increase the range of mind, one has to contemplate and hence has to reason, which is the cause of questioning. Therefore, in addition to the contemplation, both the characters follow that a query shall be put-forwarded to both, i.e., to themselves as well as to others. (shrink)

In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) as well as Walton’s (...) (1990) pretense view, which denies the existence of such entities. In the process, I propose modifications to these views to deal with problems they face and show how the modifications better account for the philosophical data. -/- Key abstractionists (van Inwagen 1977, Thomasson 1999) make a strict distinction between discourse within fiction, in which statements about literary characters cannot be literally true, and discourse about fiction, as it occurs in literary criticism, where statements about fictional characters can be literally true. Fictional objects are postulated to account for the truth of the latter. This runs into trouble because statements thought to be literally true are not literal. (Yagisawa 2001, Friend 2002) I provide a uniform analysis to account for the truth of statements involving fictional characters by appealing to a presupposition involving a metaphor in both contexts. The presupposition is that there is an x such that x is fictional; x is likened to a real person; and x is and ought to be treated/counted as a real person for all relevant intents and purposes. -/- More generally, I adopt Everett and Schroeder’s (2015) realist view that fictional characters are ideas constituted by mental representations. This, to me, better accounts for how fictional characters are created within the world’s causal nexus (unlike non-spatiotemporal entities in abstractionism), among other things. One key challenge they face is to explain how ideas can possess properties such as being a detective. I present a fine-grained version of their view, according to which the mental representations constituting fictional entities encode mind-dependent properties. Moreover, I explain how reference to such representations is possible, using Bencivenga’s (1983) Neo-Kantian view of reference and Karttunen’s (1976) view on discourse referents. Finally, I suggest that the identity of fictional characters is interest-relative. The constant, and sometimes radical, change of properties that, fictional characters can undergo is taken to be a consequence of the fact that unified mental representations are bundles of simpler mental representations. As change occurs, simpler representations are replaced by others. -/- A key theme that runs through the thesis is that neither fictionality nor pretense is relevant to the semantics of fictional sentences—a claim bolstered by Matravers’ (2014) arguments. Whether or not my account works, this claim, as well as the new philosophical data I bring up, are some of the challenges I pose to the heart of established views. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical dimensions of some of the current issues engaging rural India, affecting 600 million people. It uses the evolutionary framework of Sri Aurobindo's integral yoga, and also tags on to it the rights concepts of Amartya Sen's ethics. It attempts to take a balanced view between Ambedkar's perception of the ancient Indian village as a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism, and the more common and traditional, but historically untrue, idealized view of (...) the Vedic times. In this process it also steers clear of the pitfalls in the Marxist writings or positivist research, which has taken a wrong position that there was no rule of law and therefore no ethics as understood in modern times. It then attempts to show the more eternal features of perennial ethics in India, the idiom, institutions and the instruments it has nurtured, and the manner it is getting integrated with and is supportive of evolving modern values of democracy and social justice in Indian villages. (shrink)

Leadership styles vary across the vast Indian sub‐continent and are in a state of flux and change. The norms are influenced by ancient mythology and by imprints of world‐wide movements of political liberalism, socialism and economic globalization. But through all these styles, one discerns basic values which are universal and can be intuitively grasped by multi‐national managers. The paper describes the various sources of leadership understandings in India and relates them to Western traditions, notably to Aristotle’s ‘virtue ethics’.

According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by a (...) leading intellectualist alternative to our view. (shrink)

Recent studies by experimental philosophers demonstrate puzzling asymmetries in people’s judgments about intentional action, leading many philosophers to propose that normative factors are inappropriately influencing intentionality judgments. In this paper, I present and defend the Deep Self Model of judgments about intentional action that provides a quite different explanation for these judgment asymmetries. The Deep Self Model is based on the idea that people make an intuitive distinction between two parts of an agent’s psychology, an Acting Self that contains the (...) desires, means-end beliefs, and intentions that are the immediate causal source of an agent’s actions, and a Deep Self, which contains an agent’s stable and central psychological attitudes, including the agent’s values, principles, life goals, and other more fundamental attitudes. The Deep Self Model proposes that when people are asked to make judgments about whether an agent brought about an outcome intentionally, in addition to standard criteria proposed in traditional models, people also assess an additional ‘Concordance Criterion’: Does the outcome concord with the psychological attitudes of the agent’s Deep Self? I show that the Deep Self Model can explain a very complex pattern of judgment asymmetries documented in the experimental philosophy literature, and does so in a way that has significant advantages over competing models. (shrink)

This paper proposes relative and absolute measures of deprivation using social satisfaction functions. The relative measure gives us the amount by which social satisfaction can be increased in proportional terms by redistributing incomes equally. We also demonstrate the existence of a relationship between summary indices of deprivation and social satisfaction.

This article tries to explore the shifts in contemporary urban Bengali cinema and map and historicize the main trends in relation to changes in the political fortunes of the city. In this context, the article tentatively wishes to accomplish two things: one, to show the main trends in urban Bengali film-making, post-1990s; and two, to read closely two recent Bengali films, in a search for ways of mapping this newness. The article first identifies three new possibilities in Bengali cinema: first, (...) the inward-looking, often apolitical sketches that celebrate liberal development and psychosomatic indulgences, second, the sentimental, community-based films that sometimes take political changes on board as well, and attempt to bridge the rural-urban divide; third, cult-ish films of a newer pedigree that show impatience with old Left and progressive values, and are also technically experimental and avant-garde. The second objective of the article is to discuss specifically two contemporary filmmakers – Moinak Biswas and Suman Mukhopadhay – and place their films within this ferment. (shrink)